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Abstract
In human adults, judgment errors are known to often lead to irrational decision-making in risky contexts. While these errors
can affect the accuracy of profit evaluation, they may have once enhanced survival in dangerous contexts following a
‘‘better be safe than sorry’’ rule of thumb. Such a rule can be critical for children, and it could develop early on. Here, we
investigated the rationality of choices and the possible occurrence of judgment errors in children aged 3 to 9 years when
exposed to a risky trade. Children were allocated with a piece of cookie that they could either keep or risk in exchange of
the content of one cup among 6, visible in front of them. In the cups, cookies could be of larger, equal or smaller sizes than
the initial allocation. Chances of losing or winning were manipulated by presenting different combinations of cookie sizes in
the cups (for example 3 large, 2 equal and 1 small cookie). We investigated the rationality of children’s response using the
theoretical models of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory. Children aged 3 to 4 years old were
unable to discriminate the profitability of exchanging in the different combinations. From 5 years, children were better at
maximizing their benefit in each combination, their decisions were negatively induced by the probability of losing, and they
exhibited a framing effect, a judgment error found in adults. Confronting data to the EUT indicated that children aged over
5 were risk-seekers but also revealed inconsistencies in their choices. According to a complementary model, the Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT), they exhibited loss aversion, a pattern also found in adults. These findings confirm that adult-like
judgment errors occur in children, which suggests that they possess a survival value.
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Introduction
Individuals are regularly faced with fluctuations of their
economic or general environment which are akin to situations of
risk. When confronted to such random outcomes – the potential
loss of money for example – they have to evaluate the odds of
success, and to take the best decision. Natural selection likely
shaped decision rules that help coping with risks [1], and it is
expected that decision-making tends toward optimality [2], [3].
Decision-making under risk is a well-studied question in econom-
ics, where losses can be at stake. According to Knight [4] a risky
situation is, as opposed to an uncertain one, a situation where
probabilities are well known, like in a lottery in which the
probability of occurrence of each outcome is known – for example:
50% chances to win. A risky context is also different from an
ambiguous one where only partial information is available about
the odds – for example when the only subject’s knowledge about
the lottery outcomes is a chance of winning comprised between
50% and 100% [5].
In the realm of decision making under risk, the classical models
in economics have long been based on the assumption that
humans are rational decision-makers: when faced with a lottery
game individuals should evaluate the odds of winning and losing
before buying a ticket, and they should only chose the lottery when
the expected outcome is favorable. Studies in experimental
economics have repeatedly shown, however, that human ratio-
nality can be affected by judgment errors, meaning that decision-
making is not always optimal with regard to the maximization of
profit [6]. For example, individuals do not necessarily exhibit the
same pattern of response according to the domain of risk; some
may be risk seekers when they practice a dangerous sport, and
altogether be risk adverse when buying an insurance against some
very unlikely disasters. Another usual departure from rationality is
the pattern of loss aversion, where losses affect individuals more
than gains; to equate the psychological weight of a loss, their
potential gain must be worth two times the loss [7] and this
coefficient was found stable in several experimental setups [7], [8].
Individuals’ decisions can be strongly affected by loss aversion and
by other judgment errors in risky contexts. Another judgment
error is probability distortion. For instance, individual over-
evaluate the probability of winning in state lotteries or, in the same
vein, they underweight losing probabilities, possibly because they
are optimistic. Overweighting losses may appear little rational at
first sight, but it makes sense in critical situations. ‘‘It is better to be
safe and believe that a tiger is nearby rather than believe that no
tiger is nearby and be sorry if it turns out you’re wrong’’ (from [9],
p 62). This ‘‘better be safe than sorry’’ strategy likely lies on rules
of thumb which maximize survival rather than immediate benefits
[9]. Thus, while judgment errors may not be optimal in term of
immediate maximization of resources, they can represent a
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selected trait that once had an important positive survival value.
Using a rule of thumb may be especially relevant for children who
may fail to understand the risky nature of their surroundings. It
could prevail when rational evaluation of surroundings is not yet
fully matured. Little is known about the emergence of judgment
errors in children, but if they represent a remnant of a once
survival mechanisms we should expect that they appear early in
childhood.
Attitudes towards risk are known to develop with age [10] and a
common observation is that children are greater risk takers than
adults [10–13]. Children are arguably less experienced regarding
the negative consequences of a risky decision. They may also lack
the cognitive maturation required for accurately evaluating risks
[10]. The study of risk sensitivity in children requires a two-fold
approach. First, we need to evaluate the rationality of their
decision-making in a risky context. Second, if decisions are not
always rational, we need to decipher whether they are substan-
tiated by judgment errors and to what extent. To this aim we need
to consider the models of decision making elaborated in classical
economy for adults. The Expected Utility Theory (EUT),
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [14], states that
individuals choose among risky prospects by comparing their
expected utility values, based on their respective probabilities (see
[15]). According to EUT, a rational individual who is offered a
choice between a lottery and a certain amount is supposed to
choose the option maximizing his expected utility. Moreover, if
children behave as rational decision-makers, we should expect that
they do not distort probabilities, and that they do not exhibit loss
aversion. Adults are generally rational decision-makers [16], but
their decisions sometimes deviate from EUT predictions [6], [17].
For instance, human buy lottery tickets although, according to
EUT, the expected value of the game is negative. In this context,
they overweigh the probability of unlikely outcomes [6], [7], [18].
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) was developed to account for
these judgment errors. CPT differs from EUT in two ways. On the
one hand, value is assigned to outcomes relative to a reference
point rather than to final wealth [7] so that they are evaluated in
terms of gains and losses and losses are weighted more heavily than
gains. On the second hand, the model includes a non linear
probability weighting function, which takes into account the fact
that individuals distort probabilities: overweighting chances in the
domain of losses, underweighting them in the domain of gains. An
understanding of risk similar to the adult is found at around 11–12
years of age [10–12], [19], and several errors in judgment have
been reported in adolescents [20–22]. While adolescent have the
mean to evaluate the risk inherent to a given context, their
decisions are strongly affected by a heightened emotional
responsiveness that is typically aroused in situation of risk or
when gains are at stakes. This affective decision-making [23] is
thought to frequently overrule a more rational evaluation, which
would explain risk-seeking conducts at youth age. In that respect,
adolescents represent a ‘‘special case’’ in the study of attitudes
towards risk.
Children as young as 2 years of age can enter in exchanges with
experimenters [24], and from 4–5 years they display a good
intuitive understanding of probability concepts in risky decision-
making [25–27]. Harbaugh et al. [10] tested 5- to 13-year-old
children in a game where they could choose between a sure
outcome (gain or loss) and a lottery with the same expected value.
Winning led to obtain tokens that could be used afterwards to buy
toys. They found that children underweighted low-probability
events and overweighed high-probability ones. However, these
results cannot be generalized in the context of EUT or CPT since
children based their value judgment on secondary reinforcement
and not on a direct evaluation of utility. Besides, the occurrence of
other judgment errors such as loss aversion and their strength was
not estimated.
In this study we tested the attitude towards risk of children aged
between 3 and 9 years in a simple choice task between a lottery
and a certain outcome. Children were first endowed with an initial
piece of cookie (the certain outcome) that they could exchange for
the content of one cup chosen at random among six visible (the
lottery). The food rewards contained in the cups could be larger,
equivalent, or smaller in size than the initial endowment making it
possible to evaluate directly the utility of the outcome. We
manipulated the chances to win or lose and recorded the children
choices. By confronting their choices to the predictions from either
EUT which assumes rational decision-making, or from CPT
which assumes probability distortion and loss aversion, we aimed
at deciphering 1) if children decision-making is fully rational in a
risky context (i.e. allowing them to maximize their expected utility
as predicted by the EUT model), and if not 2) whether their
judgment is affected by known judgment errors and how early they
occur. If judgment errors indeed possess a survival value, and once
compensated for a slow maturation of the brain, they should be
detectable early on in children.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethical authorization to work with children was given by the
University of St-Andrews ethics committee, UTREC (reference
nuPS5528). Parents were given a letter describing the general
purpose of the study and written parental consent was required for
children to participate in the tests. Participation was on an unpaid,
voluntary basis, but children kept the sweets that they won during
the testing session. A video camera recorded the session after
parental written consent had been obtained.
Participants and conditions
A sample of 288 children was divided into six age-groups: 3
years old (mean age 6 SEM=42.362.2 months), 4 years old
(mean age = 54.364.2), 5 years old (mean age = 65.561.9), 6 years
old (mean age = 78.063.4), 7 years old (mean age = 89.363.6) and
8 years old (mean age = 100.064.0). Equal numbers of girls and
boys were tested in each of groups. Twelve additional children
whose parents had given consent were tested, but were excluded
from the dataset analyzed for being outside of the appropriate age
ranges, or for not paying attention to the tests. Participants were
European, with English as their first language. The experiment
took place at the Living Links to Human Evolution’ Research
Centre in Edinburgh zoo. Children were recruited upon their visit
to the ‘‘Budongo trail’’.
Tests were conducted in a small area (2.562 m) limited by four
occluders allowing an entire visual seclusion from public. Children
were individually tested while seated on a chair or on their parent’s
lap in front of a square table (161 m). The apparatus consisted of
six aligned plastic cups containing pieces of cookies of various
dimensions (Figure 1).
Exchange procedure
The experimenter was unfamiliar to the children. Before testing,
the experimenter introduced herself to the child to put them at
ease. Only one parent was allowed to stay with the child during
testing. Parents were instructed not to interfere by initiating
communication or interactions during testing; if a child sought
interaction with parents, they were asked to draw the child’s
attention back to the experimenter without directing her/his
Risky Decisions in Children
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response or give any hints of what s/he was supposed to do. If the
child wanted to interact with the experimenter, she repeated the
instructions and encouraged her/him to redirect her/his attention
to the task. During testing children were seated on a chair across
from the experimenter.
The experiment lasted approximately 20 minutes. During the
training phase, each child was asked to indicate a preference for
either a small piece of cookie of dimension 160.560.5 cm or a
larger piece of cookie of dimension 460.560.5 cm. Each child
selected the larger reward. Then, the child was given the small
piece of cookie, and was invited to return it to obtain the larger
one. If the child exchanged successfully, the test started. If s/he
failed, the request was repeated twice. If nothing happened after
5 s, testing ended. We did not control for the level of hunger of
children. However, subjects were given a plastic bag, and they
were informed that they could save for later the cookie that they
received.
In each trial the experimenter first presented in one hand the
initial piece of cookie of 460.560.5 cm, and in the other six
aligned plastic cups containing pieces of cookie of various
dimensions: 160.560.5 cm (small size), 460.560.5 cm (medium
size) and 46260.5 cm (large size - sequence of four
460.560.5 cm pieces of cookies) (Figure 1). The experimenter
gave the initial medium piece of cookie to the child, and held out
her empty hand offering the child the chance to give the initial
item back ‘‘Here is a piece of cookie and here are others cookies.
Do you prefer to keep the cookie or do you want to swap it to have
one of these one?’’. If the child returned it, s/he received the
content of one cup chosen randomly. (randomization was
implemented prior to the session using a software, www.
randomizer.org). If the child chose to keep the initial item, the
experimenter ended the trial, allowing the child to consume the
initial item or store it into a bag (the child was told that the bags
could be used to store the cookies so that the child could take them
with him after the game). Whatever the choice of the child, the
experimenter proceeded with the next trial.
The probability to lose and to gain was manipulated via 11
combinations of two trials each (Table 1). A first half of children
were run in Condition A presenting a step by step decrease in the
chances to win from combinations # 0 to # 10 then a step by step
increase in the chances to win from combinations # 10 to # 0.
The other half was run in Condition B presenting first gradually
increasing chances to win then decreasing chances.
Analysis procedure and theoretical predictions
Economic theoretical models require individuals to respect first-
order stochastic dominance which translate in our study by always
exchanging when 100% chances of winning and never exchanging
when 100% chances of losing. In our dataset, 24.7% of the children
always accepted to exchange at the combination # 0 (no loss) and
always refused at the combination # 10 (no gain). Because the
percentage of return at each combination between these children
and the whole population was similar according to age, we further
included the data of all the tested children in the models.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [14] introduced the Expected
Utility Theory (EUT) stating individual preferences with a
mathematical function named as ‘‘utility function’’. Under EUT,
we assume that subjects evaluate values of outcomes in terms of
utility, measured by the volume of each piece of cookie, because
they are consumption amounts [28], [29]. The item volume of
options xi are weighted by their respective probabilities pi, and
compared by the individuals to determine their choice. Let x = ((xi,
pi),i = 1,…,n) denote a lottery where xi is the i-th outcome, and pi
the corresponding probability. Rational individual who is offered a
choice between the lottery x and a certain amount W is supposed
to choose the option with the higher expected value maximizing
their expected utility and to keep the certain amount if:
u(W )wE½u(x)uu(W )w
Xn
i~1
piu(xi)
As for the utility function we chose the power function u(y) = yd, m
y, because it allows to derive risk preferences of individuals. In this
function, y is the quantity of item and d is the risk aversion
parameter. Evaluating each item value y is a straightforward way
to measure the item volume. Indeed, smaller pieces of cookies of
160.560.5 cm were valued 0.25, pieces of cookie of
460.560.5 cm were valued 1, and larger pieces of cookie
46260.5 cm were valued 4. As children could obtain only one
piece of cookie among the six offered, the evaluation of each
combination of rewards is also straightforward (Table 2). For
instance, the combination # 3 containing 2 small, 1 medium and
3 large rewards was evaluated E[u(#3)] = (2/660.25d)+(1/
661d)+(3/664d) in EUT.
In each trial the experimenter offered the medium item, and
children had to choose between keeping it or giving it back in
order to obtain one cup of rewards. According to EUT children
should prefer the gamble to the medium item if the expected utility
of the gamble exceeded the utility of the certain outcome (Table 2).
For instance, in # 3 the gamble was preferred if [(#3)].(1)d.
Under the simpler assumption that children are risk neutral (d=1),
they should exchange rather than keep the medium item from
combination # 0 to # 8 when the expected utility was equal to or
higher than the utility of the certain initial amount (Table 2).
Conversely, children should refuse to exchange in the last
Figure 1. Six plastic cups containing pieces of cookies of various dimensions: two pieces of cookie of 46260.5 cm (sequence of four 460.560.5 cm -
left position), two pieces of cookie of 460.560.5 cm (middle position) and two pieces of cookie of 160.560.5 cm (right position) corresponding to
the combination of rewards # 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.g001
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combinations (# 9 and # 10) because the expected utility is lower
than the utility of the certain outcome. If subjects are not risk neutral
(d?1), we need to assess a risk aversion parameter d. Children are
risk averse (d,1) when, between two options with identical expected
values, they prefer the safer option, and risk-seeking (d.1) when
they choose the risky option [30]. Detecting at which combination
children become indifferent between the risky and the certain item
can be used to infer the risk aversion parameter values.
Under Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), subjects evaluate
the opportunity to play the lottery x = ((xi, pi),i = 1,…,n) by
computing a valuation function V(x) defined as follows:
V (x)~V (xz)zV (x{)~
Xn
i~mz1
pzi v(xi)z
Xm
i~1
p{i v(xi)
where xz~max(0,x); x{~{max(0,{x)
The first element of CPT is to define x in terms of net gains and
losses, and to rank the outcomes of the lottery in increasing order.
The evaluation function is defined over these two domains with
different decisions weights pi and a specific value function v(.). The
value function is analogous to the utility function of EUT but is
defined differently over gains and losses:
v(y)~
ya if y§0
{lyb if yv0

with l.1 (loss aversion) and 0,a, b#1 (diminishing sensitivity)
The value function is generally concave on gains, convex on
losses, and kinked at 0. The loss aversion parameter l indicates
that subjects are loss averse if l.1, which means that in any
choice where a loss of k is at stake, subjects accept the bet if the net
potential gain is higher than l times k. Tversky and Kahneman [8]
experimentally identified a median value of l=2.25, indicating
pronounced loss aversion. In our study this value would mean that
children accepted to lose a medium piece of cookie if s/he could
gain a piece of cookie with a size 2.25 times the medium piece of
cookie.
Here, gains and losses were amounts of cookies that were
directly consumed by children in excess or less than the reference
consumption amount 1. To simplify, we used a= b=1 (for
piecewise linear functions, Figure 2). For instance, for children
using CPT in their choice, combination # 3 was perceived as an
opportunity to realize 3 gains (3 large instead of 3 medium items),
each evaluated 3 (4 - 1), and to incur 2 losses (2 small instead of 2
medium items), each evaluated 20.75 (0.25–1).
The second element explaining the choice of children using
CPT in decision-making is the weighting parameter. Individuals
use weights of outcomes instead of probabilities, represented by a
non-linear function w(:) that is defined separately on the
cumulative probability distribution of gains (+) and losses (2):
p{1 ~w
{(p1)
p{i ~w
{(Fx(xi)){w
{(Fx(xi{1))~w
{(
Pi
j~1
pj ){w
{(
Pi{1
j~1
pj ) for 2ƒiƒm
pzn ~w
z(pn)
pzi ~w
z(1{Fx(xi{1)){w
z(1{Fx(xi))~w
z(
Pi
j~1
pj ){w
z(
Pn
j~iz1
pj ) for mvivn
where Fx is the cumulative distribution function of lottery x. The
probability weighting function put forward in the literature is
generally inverse S-shaped. To simplify, we used w+(.) =w2(.) = w
Table 1. Number (#) and content of cups for each combination of rewards.
Combinations of rewards
# Content of cups # Content of cups
0 L L L L L L
1 L L L L M M 6 L M M M M M
2 L L L L S S 7 L M M S S S
3 L L L M S S 8 L M S S S S
4 L L M M S S 9 L S S S S S
5 L L S S S S 10 S S S S S S
S (Small) indicates pieces of cookie of dimension 160.560.5 cm, M (Medium) indicates pieces of cookie of 460.560.5 cm, and L (Large) indicates pieces of cookie of
46260.5 cm (sequence of four 460.560.5 cm pieces of cookie).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t001
Table 2. Evaluation of each combination of rewards
following the Expected Utility Theory (d is the risk aversion
parameter), with d= 1 (neutrality to risk).
# EUT d=1
EUT evaluation
(d=1)
0 4d.(6/6) 4 EU.certain
amount
1 4d.(4/6)+1d.(2/6) 3
2 4d.(4/6)+0.25d.(2/6) 2.75
3 4d.(3/6)+1d.(1/6)+0.25d.(2/6) 2.25
4 4d.(2/6)+1d.(2/6)+0.25d.(2/6) 1.75
5 4d.(2/6)+0.25d.(4/6) 1.5
6 4d.(1/6)+1d.(5/6) 1.5
7 4d.(1/6)+1d.(2/6)+0.25d.(3/6) 1.125
8 4d.(1/6)+1d.(1/6)+0.25d.(4/6) 1 EU= certain
amount
9 4d.(1/6)+0.25d.(5/6) 0.875 EU,certain
amount
10 0.25d.(6/6) 0.25
From combination # 0 to # 7, the expected utility is superior to the certain
amount, and children should exchange. For combination # 8, the expected
utility is equal to the certain amount. For combinations # 9 and # 10, the
expected utility is inferior to the certain amount, thus children should not
exchange.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t002
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(.) and made our computations with the Tversky and Kahneman
[8] probability weighting function:
w(p)~
pc
(pcz(1{p)c)
1=c
where c is the probability distortion parameter, w(0) = 0 and
w(1) = 1
This specific probability weighting function takes the shape of
an inverse S if 0,c,1, which is a common characteristic of all
weighting functions [31]. In this function, c both controls for the
level of the inflexion point and for the curvature. Tversky and
Kahneman [8], Camerer and Ho [32] and Wu and Gonzalez [33]
have estimated the weighting function to a value of 0.56, 0.61 and
0.71, respectively. Figure 3a gives an example with a value c=0.6
estimated by Tversky and Kahneman, meaning that subjects
perceive low probabilities (under 0.35) higher and high probabil-
ities (over 0.35) lower than their actual value. In adults, studies
showed risk-seeking over small-probability gains and high-proba-
bility losses, and risk-aversion over high-probability gains and
small-probability losses [8].
The evaluation of each combination deeply depends on values
chosen for c and l. Table 3 presents CPT evaluations of all
combinations of rewards with no probability distortion, i.e. c=1,
and with no loss aversion, i.e. l=1. For instance, for c=1 (no
probability distortion as w(p) = p) and l=2.25 (loss aversion), we
would get V(# 3) = 1.88 which would indicate that, according to
CPT, children should accept to exchange the initial item. A
negative value would indicate that children should keep the initial
item.
Results
The decision to exchange was affected by age (GLM, z= 2.6,
p,0.001), the younger children exchanging less than the older
children (Figure 3). This was particularly true for the 3- and 4-
year-olds (percentage of return = 25.8% and 42.2%) compared to
other groups (5 years: 54.3%; 6 years: 58.2%; 7 years: 56.3% and
8 years: 56.9%; Table 4). Children exchanged more (GLM,
z= 1.4, p,0.001) for ‘‘winning only’’ (64.1%, combination # 0)
and ‘‘zero chances to lose’’ combinations (54.5%, combination #
6) than for ‘‘losing only’’ combination (26.2%; combination # 10).
A combined effect of age and combination affected their
responses. Before 5 years, children discriminated only between
‘‘no chances to win’’ (combination # 10) and ‘‘no loss’’
(combinations # 0 and/or # 1). Above 5 years, all age groups
discriminated between ‘‘no loss’’ (combination # 0) and ‘‘no win’’
(combination # 1), and both these combinations were significantly
discriminated from most of the others (Table 5). With respect to
conditions – condition A with increasing chances to win then
decreasing chances, and condition B with decreasing chances then
increasing – we observed a framing effect; children starting with
winning combinations exchanged more often than children
starting with losing combinations (GLM, z= 2.2, p,0.05).
Exchange rates were low for combinations with highest probability
of loss (# 9 and # 10) regardless of the condition (GLM
interaction condition x combination, z = 1.2, p,0.001).
We further assessed the effect of age, probability of winning PG,
probability of losing PL, and variables resulting from previous
outcomes (OP: outcome received at the previous trial, OS:
cumulative outcome since the start of the mid-condition, OCUM:
cumulative outcome since the start of the testing session) on the
response of children. There was no significant effect of outcomes
on the percentage of exchange (GLM, OP: z = 0.7, p=0.18; OS:
z = 0.1, p=0.99; OCUM: z = 0.1, p=0.94). Age (GLM, z= 5.8,
p,0.001), and probabilities of winning (GLM, z= 4.5, p,0.001) or
losing (GLM, z=26.7, p,0.001) significantly affected responses
(Table 6). The probability of losing affected the responses of the 5-,
6- and 7-year-olds more than any other factor. The 8-year-old
children took both the probability of winning and the probability
of losing into account. A similar trend was observed in 7-year-olds.
The percentage or return decreased with decreasing expected
utility and children exchanged significantly less often when the
expected utility was inferior to the certain amount (i.e. 1, for the
combinations # 9 and # 10).
In view of the previous results, we conducted analyses on the
three age categories: 3–4 years, 5–6 years, and 7–8 years to test
whether their response fitted with EUT. We compared the
frequency of choices of the lottery against 50%, i.e. the frequency
obtained if children decided randomly whether to exchange or
not. In accordance with EUT the percentage of returned items for
each age decreased from the combination of rewards # 0 to # 10.
All children presented a percentage of return significantly smaller
than 50% only for combination # 10 (Table 7), which was not
consistent with EUT predicting that, under risk neutrality (d=1),
children should not exchange for combinations # 9 and # 10
(Table 2). Given that under EUT, risk neutrality could not explain
the behaviour of children, we inferred a risk aversion parameter (d)
by detecting the combination at which the percentage of return
became significantly lower than 50%. The low return rates of 3–4
years for most combinations (inferior to 50%) did not allow finding
this value. For children aged 5–6 and 7–8 years, the certain loss
combination (# 10) was the one for which the percentage dropped
under 50% (Table 7); we found d$1.17 which is .1 and indicates
that they were risk-seekers. However, risk-seeking children (d.1)
should also exchange at a higher rate in combination # 5 than in
combination # 6 (risk-neutral children, d=1, should exchange at
the same rate for combinations # 5 and # 6 and risk-averse
children, d,1, should exchange at a lower rate in combination #
5 than in combination # 6, Table 2). Contrary to this prediction,
children aged 5–6 and 7–8 years exchanged significantly more
often for combination # 6 than # 5 (Student’s t-test, 5–6 years:
t47 =23.67, p,0.01; 7–8 years: t47 =21.97, p,0.05, Table 7).
Under EUT, no risk parameter value can explain both refusal to
exchange for combination # 10, and preference to exchange for
combination # 6 compared to # 5. This final result strongly
Figure 2. Kahneman and Tversky evaluation function for
a= b=1, l=2.25, and a reference point of 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.g002
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indicates that children decisions could not be fully accounted for in
a EUT framework.
To account for children’s deviation from the rational choice
predicted by EUT, we investigated whether their response can be
better explained by another theoretical model, the Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT, Table 3). In this model, value is assigned
to gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than to final
wealth [7], [8]. Choices can depend on the level of the loss
aversion parameter (l) and the level (c) of the weighting function
parameter, i.e. how children distort probabilities. Although the
utility of combinations # 5 and # 6 is equivalent, the presence of
the potential for loss (presence of small pieces of cookies) in
combination # 5, and its absence in combination # 6, may
explain the responses of children. To examine this hypothesis, we
first made the assumption of no probability distortion (fixing
arbitrarily c=1), and we determined the corresponding level of
the loss aversion parameter (l) based on the return rate of the
combinations # 5 and # 6. The return rate of children aged 5–6
and 7–8 was higher than 50% for combination# 5 and# 6 (albeit
not significant for combination # 5, Table 7), thus we search the
value of l for which children accepted the gamble for both
combinations, and for which they exchanged more for combina-
tion # 6 than # 5. We found 1,l#2 for both age categories
(Figure 4a); this indicates that children aged over 5 were highly loss
Figure 3. Percentage of returned items for each age according to the combination of rewards. The bar indicates the threshold of 50% of
exchange. Combinations with no common letters differ significantly at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.g003
Table 3. Evaluation of each combination of rewards
following the Cumulative Prospect Theory (without
probability distortion and loss aversion).
CPT CPT
#
no probability
distortion: c=1 no loss aversion: l=1
0 0 6.(1-w(1))
1 3 6.(1-w(1/3))
2 4-0.5l 6.(1-w(1/3))-3.375.w(1/3)
3 3-0.5l 6.(1-w(1/2))-3.375.w(1/3)
4 2-0.5l 6.(1-w(2/3))-3.375.w(1/3)
5 2-l 6.(1-w(2/3))-3.375.w(2/3)
6 1 6.(1-w(5/6))
7 1-0.75l 6.(1-w(5/6))-3.375.w(1/2)
8 1-l 6.(1-w(5/6))-3.375.w(2/3)
9 1-1.25l 6.(1-w(5/6))-3.375.w(5/6)
10 1-1.5l 6.(1-w(1))-3.375.w(1)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t003
Risky Decisions in Children
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 1 | e52316
averse: when a loss was at stake, subjects accepted to exchange if
the net potential gain was higher than at least 1 to 2 times the loss.
If we make the assumption of no loss aversion (fixing arbitrarily
l=1), we can employ the Kahneman and Tversky’s probability
weighting function in order to find c, the probability distortion
parameter. For both age groups, we determined the value of c for
which children accepted the gamble for combinations # 5 and #
6, but exchanged more for combination # 6 than # 5. We found
0.32,c,1 for both age groups (Figure 4b). This value points at a
strong probability distortion. The function takes the shape of an
inverse S-shaped with an inflexion point close to a probability of
0.15; individuals perceived low probabilities under 0.15 higher
than their actual value, and high probabilities over 0.15 lower than
their actual value (Figure 5b). However, for these values of c we
cannot explain why children rejected the gamble for combination
# 10.
The loss aversion parameter l and the probability distortion
parameter c can also be assessed together. For both categories, we
determined the values of l and c based on the conditions
previously used, i.e. the return rate of combinations # 5 and # 6,
and the combination after which children rejected the gamble. We
found that values of c were acceptable only when l.1 (Figure 4c),
indicating that loss aversion was critical in the choices of 5–6 and
7–8 years old. For the probability distortion parameter, all values
of c were acceptable (, or .1; Figure 4c). For instance, l=2.5
and c=0.6 meant that children were loss averse, and overweighed
low-probability events while underweighting high-probability
ones. As another example for acceptable values, l=1.5 and
c=1.3 meant that children were loss averse, and underweighted
low-probability events while overweighting high-probability ones.
These results on loss aversion hold if the probability weighting
function is either convex (or concave) for gains, and concave (or
convex) for losses. Therefore, the non-linearity of the value
function (loss aversion) override the non-linearity of the weighting
function, making loss aversion the main discriminatory criterion in
choices of children aged over 5.
Table 4. Comparisons of the mean percentage of return
between the different age-groups using Tukey HSD pairwise
comparison post-hoc tests.
Tukey HSD pairwise comparison test
age Z value p
3-4 3.37 0.13
3-5 5.94 ,0.001
3-6 6.96 ,0.001
3-7 6.40 ,0.001
3-8 6.30 ,0.001
4-5 2.59 ,0.05
4-6 3.61 ,0.05
4-7 3.03 ,0.01
4-8 2.96 ,0.01
5-6 1.03 0.91
5-7 0.42 0.99
5-8 0.39 0.99
6-7 20.62 0.99
6-8 20.64 0.98
7-8 20.03 1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t004
Table 5. Tukey HSD pairwise comparison post-hoc tests for combinations significantly differing by the mean percentage of return.
3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years
combinations Z value p Z value p Z value p Z value p Z value p Z value p
1-0 23.29 ,0.05
4-0 23.43 ,0.05 23.30 ,0.05 23.29 ,0.05
5-0 23.58 ,0.05 24.14 ,0.05 23.30 ,0.05
7-0 23.24 ,0.05 24.42 ,0.001 24.27 ,0.001 23.58 ,0.05
8-0 23.41 ,0.05 24.56 ,0.001
9-0 23.24 ,0.05
10-0 23.63 ,0.05 24.05 ,0.01 27.19 ,0.001 26.56 ,0.001 26.50 ,0.001 27.13 ,0.001
10-1 23.97 ,0.01 26.46 ,0.001 24.90 ,0.001 23.63 ,0.05 25.47 ,0.001
10-2 25.40 ,0.001 24.16 ,0.001 24.47 ,0.001 25.33 ,0.001
10-3 25.24 ,0.001 25.33 ,0.001 24.61 ,0.001 25.07 ,0.001
10-4 25.55 ,0.001 23.57 ,0.05 23.63 ,0.05 24.39 ,0.001
10-5 24.13 ,0.01 23.63 ,0.05 24.53 ,0.001
7-6 23.31 ,0.05
8-6 23.46 ,0.05
10-6 26.46 ,0.001 25.61 ,0.001 24.75 ,0.001 26.00 ,0.001
10-7 24.45 ,0.001 24.12 ,0.001
10-8 24.29 ,0.001 23.77 ,0.01 24.80 ,0.001
10-9 24.45 ,0.001 24.89 ,0.001 23.91 ,0.01 24.80 ,0.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t005
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Discussion
All children engaged in a trading game providing a typical risky
economic situation. Children aged 3 to 4 years old displayed an
exchange rate inferior to 50%, so we could not identify risk-related
biases in their decision-making. At this age, children display good
performances in delay-of-gratification tasks, including the ex-
change task [24], [34]; thus, the ability to control impulsivity, i.e.
keeping the initial endowment instead of eating it, was not a
limiting factor in this study. Lesser abilities in probabilistic
evaluation may explain this failure as they only discriminated
between the no gain and no loss combinations. In everyday life
children commonly encounter binary choices (‘‘you will have or
you won’t have a dessert’’), but are seldom submitted to choices
offering probabilities (‘‘you have a one in five chance to have a
dessert’’). Failure in adapting their return to combinations may
also be due to the use of heuristics, i.e. intuitive judgment; for
example they may have used a rule consisting in summing the
content of the six cups (‘‘I see a lot of cookies, I try’’).
Children aged 5–6 years were able to adapt their return
according to the combinations of rewards. Responses were mainly
based on the probability of losing. This finding is consistent with
the development of probability estimation by age 5 [25], [27],
[35], [36]. Although probably incomplete [37], [38], the
understanding of probabilistic rules in 5-year-old children allowed
them to attempt optimizing their benefits. Better performances
were observed in children aged 7–8 years, as they were more
discriminative with the combinations. Still, the decision was not
always rational given that some children kept on exchanging for
the ‘‘no win’’ combination, and refused for the ‘‘no loss’’
combination.
Our results show that decision-making was affected by several
judgment errors. We detected a framing effect; children starting
with high probabilities of gain exchanged more than children
starting with low probabilities of gain. Variations in framing are
known to affect significantly decisions and risk-aversion in adults
[39], [40]. Individuals are risk-averse when presented with value-
increasing options, but more risk-taking when faced with
decreasing values [41–43]. Recent studies have reported that
behavioral responses to framing may vary according to the set-up
used [40]. For example, high incentives to win can have more
impact on risk aversion than low incentives. Future research will
have to compare the framing effects detected in children with
those found in adults.
When confronting data to the expected utility model, we found
that children aged over 5 appeared to behave almost consistently
with EUT model with a risk-seeking attitude. However some
results could not be explained in this framework. Instead, the
definition of rationality as in EUT should be alleviated and CPT
could explain better the errors observed among children decisions.
Specifically, implementing a loss aversion parameter strongly
Table 7. Student’s t-tests on the percentage of return for each combination.
Combinations Number of cups 3–4 years 5–6 years 7–8 years
mean %
of
return
# Large Medium Small t p t p t p
0 6 0 0 21.73 0.09 7.09 ,0.001 7.83 ,0.001 64.07
1 4 2 0 22.31 ,0.05 4.23 ,0.001 2.21 ,0.05 54.34
2 4 0 2 23.78 ,0.001 2.44 ,0.05 3.14 ,0.01 51.90
3 3 1 2 23.85 ,0.001 2.92 ,0.01 2.75 ,0.01 52.30
4 2 2 2 24.58 ,0.001 1.85 0.07 1.18 0.25 48.09
5 2 0 4 23.86 ,0.001 20.15 0.88* 1.16 0.25* 46.52
6 1 5 0 25.05 ,0.001 4.80 ,0.001* 4.32 ,0.001* 54.53
7 1 2 3 23.29 ,0.01 0 1 0.13 0.90 46.01
8 1 1 4 24.78 ,0.001 20.31 0.76 1.73 0.09 45.13
9 1 0 5 24.58 ,0.001 2.42 ,0.05** 1.96 ,0.05** 49.31
10 0 0 6 27.97 ,0.001 26.42 ,0.001** 26.18 ,0.001** 26.22
mean % of return 33.95 56.34 56.62
(3 years = 25.76; 4 years = 42.15) (5 years = 54.27; 6 years = 58.42) (7 years = 56.34; 8
years = 56.91)
Italic values indicate that the mean number of return for a combination is significantly smaller than 50%; non-italic values indicate that the mean number of return for a
combination is significantly higher than 50%.
**: combinations for which children accepted to exchange for a specific combination, but refused for the following one;
*: combinations offering the same evaluation in the EUT at which children should exchange at the same rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t007
Table 6. Influence of the probability of losing PL (getting a
small piece of cookie in this trial), the probability of gaining PG
(getting a large piece of cookie in this trial), and the
interaction PL x PG on the exchange behaviors of children.
Variables 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years
PL z =21.081 z =20.345 z =24.267 z =23.303 z =22.554 z =23.777
(p = 0.28) (p = 0.73) (p,2e25) (p,9e24) (p,0.05) (p,2e24)
PG z = 1.407 z = 1.499 z = 0.305 z = 1.370 z = 1.670 z = 0.991
(p = 0.16) (p = 0.13) (p = 0.76) (p = 0.17) (p = 0.10) (p = 0.32)
PL*PG z = 0.683 z =20.364 z = 1.414 z = 0.861 z = 1.866 z = 1.994
(p = 0.50) (p = 0.72) (p = 0.16) (p = 0.39) (p = 0.06) (p,0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.t006
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explained deviations from rational behavior. The acceptable
values of loss aversion parameter is comprised between 1 and 2,
which is close (although inferior) to Kahneman and Tversky’s
experimentally validated value of 2.25 for adults and adolescents
[7], [8]. This means that, facing a risky decision, children accept to
exchange if the net potential gain is higher than at least one to two
times the amount of the loss. Adult’s studies suggest that loss
aversion can depend on the initial wealth and the level of trust and
education [44]. Finding loss aversion in young children supports
the notion that this pattern is not solely depending on such
environmental factors. Further studies involving adults with the
same paradigm should help decipher whether the difference in
value of the loss aversion parameter reflects (or not) a stronger
aversion to loss in adult compare to children. A second parameter
known to affect decision-making in risky situations is probability
distortion. It is often reported for adults in circumstances involving
extreme probabilities such as state lotteries [45] and was reported
in children by Harbaugh et al. [10]. Here, we also found
probability distortion with children overweighting or under-
weighting probabilities. However, we could evaluate its relative
impact compared to the loss aversion effect. We found that the
value function (loss aversion) overrode the nonlinearity of the
weighting function. This makes loss aversion the main pattern
explaining children’s decision-making.
From a neuropsychological point of view, the general improve-
ment in rational decision-making between 3 and 8 is in agreement
with the development of several brain functions involved in the
control of impulsivity and reward valuation [23]. This develop-
ment is non linear as the brain circuits supporting those functions
mature at different speed. Self-regulatory mechanisms involved in
the control of impulsivity [46] are related to the maturation of the
prefrontal cortex that is the latest structure to be fully mature – this
occurs at around 20 years. Affective decision-making, i.e. the fact
that decision is partially governed by emotions depends among
other structures on the maturation of the nuclei accubens, and
reach a pick of responsiveness at adolescence [46]. The
adolescents experience the emotions associated to risk, and are
attracted by gains more strongly than younger children or even
adults, which explains the observation that they can be more risk
seeking. Eight-year-old children have better control of impulsivity
than younger ones, yet they are not at an age where affective
decision-making will overrule their rational evaluation, thus the
Figure 5. Probability weighting function a. for c=0.6 (Kahneman and Tversky). The inflexion point is close to a probability of 0.35;
individuals perceive low probabilities under 0.35 higher than their actual value and high probabilities over 0.35 lower than their actual value. b. for
children aged over 5 years (0.32,c,1). For c= 0.33, the inflexion point is close to a probability of 0.15; individuals perceive low probabilities
under 0.15 higher than their actual value and high probabilities over 0.15 lower than their actual value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.g005
Figure 4. Estimation of the loss aversion parameter l, and the probability distortion parameter c: a. Under the assumption of no probability
distortion (fixing arbitrarily c= 1, grey continuous line), 1,l#2; b. Under the assumption of no loss aversion (fixing arbitrarily l= 1, grey continuous
line), 0.32,c,1; c. Acceptable values for both loss aversion and probability distortion parameters (grey area).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052316.g004
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improved rationality in their decisions compared to younger
children appears consistent with what would be expected.
The occurrence of adult-like loss aversion in children as young
as 5 confirms that judgment errors appear early, suggesting that it
is deeply rooted in human evolutionary history. To investigate this
hypothesis further, similar study should be run to evaluate decision
under risk in children from different cultures. If loss aversion
appears to be an ancestral trait, it probably means that some time
in our evolution, it improved the quality of decision-making by
enhancing survival. In our present world where economics rule
many exchanges between individuals, loss aversion sometimes
conducts to negative profitability [44]; by case, it may induce
investors to keep their investment for too long instead of selling
assets [47]; it may also lead to excessive risk-taking, resulting in
strong losses [48–51]. In this particular context loss aversion may
have become a non-adaptive pattern rather than a survival asset.
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